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Recent empirical work has shown that ongoing international financial integration 
facilitates cross-country consumption risk-sharing. These studies typically find that 
countries with high equity home bias exhibit relatively low international consumption 
risk sharing. We extend this line of research and demonstrate that it is not only a 
country’s equity home bias that prevents consumption risk sharing. In addition, the 
composition of a country’s foreign asset portfolio plays an important role. Using 
panel-data regression for a group of OECD countries over the period 1980-2007, we 
show that foreign investment bias has additional explanatory power for consumption 
risk sharing.  
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In recent years, international financial integration has broadened investment 
opportunity sets fundamentally. Investors increasingly have easy access to 
international capital markets that allow improved diversification and risk 
sharing. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007, 2008) show that gross foreign 
asset and liability positions as a fraction of GDP for a group of OECD 
countries have grown almost fivefold over the past two decades. Also they 
demonstrate that the composition of international balance sheets in terms of 
geographical allocation and currency denomination is highly heterogeneous. 
 
Theoretical models of international financial markets (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 
1996; LeRoy and Werner, 2001) demonstrate that perfect integration allows 
a decoupling of domestic consumption from idiosyncratic shocks to domestic 
output. In these models, countries can buy insurance against all future states 
of the world – that is all paths of future domestic output – and thereby shield 
their income and consumption from domestic output fluctuations. To test the 
above hypothesis, empirical analysis typically takes the regression proposed 
by Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991) and Lewis (1996) as a starting point. It 
specifies idiosyncratic consumption growth as the dependent variable and 
idiosyncratic output growth as the independent variable. Under perfect risk 
sharing, the regression coefficient converges to zero while under autarky the 
coefficient is equal to one. Early empirical research along these lines strongly 
rejects international financial integration and full consumption risk sharing.  
 
More recent work assumes that the regression coefficient is a function of 
other economic or institutional variables which may be time-variant. Then, 
non-linear specifications result. Work along these lines by Fratzscher and 
Imbs (2009), Kose et al. (2009), Sørensen et al. (2007), and Bracke and 
Schmitz (2011) stresses the role of foreign investment for international 
consumption risk-sharing. Generally, the evidence shows that consumption 3 
 
risk sharing increases with higher financial openness and development and 
lower financial home bias.  
 
In the current paper, we contribute to the literature above by accounting for 
the role of composition and geographical diversification in foreign equity 
portfolios. First, we argue that it is not the size of foreign portfolio 
investment as a fraction of domestic wealth alone that provides risk sharing. 
In addition, the composition of the foreign asset portfolio should matter as 
well. The closer the foreign portfolio weights – conditional on the market 
value of that portfolio – approximate the world portfolio, the better a 
country’s risk sharing should be. Following Bekaert and Wang (2009) – 
henceforth BW09 –, we use the term foreign investment bias to label 
deviations of actual from optimal portfolio weights. Note that equity home 
bias and foreign investment bias are expected to have complementary roles: 
high equity home bias in combination with an absence of foreign investment 
bias will not yield significant consumption risk sharing in general. On the 
other hand, low equity home bias together with extremely high foreign 
investment bias may not do the job either. In our paper, we use a foreign 
investment bias measure proposed by BW09 and Holinski (2010). 
 
Second, we note that the overall degree of foreign investment bias may not 
be sufficient to measure the risk sharing potential of the foreign asset 
portfolio. That is, it matters in which countries there is overinvestment and in 
which underinvestment because countries differ in the degree of 
diversification benefits offered to the home economy. Underinvestment in 
countries with low diversification potential and simultaneous overinvestment 
in countries with high diversification potential is expected to yield higher 
benefits than the other way around. For this reason, we develop two 
measures of diversification potential. The first measure relies on the distance 
between countries as a proxy of information and familiarity problems. This 
variable is often used in gravity models of international trade (Melitz, 2007 
and Fazio et al., 2008) as well as in the home bias literature (e.g. Chan, 4 
 
Covrig and Ng, 2005 and Ahearne, Griever and Warnock, 2004).
1 The second 
is the bilateral GDP correlation, which is a direct measure of the degree of 
idiosyncratic shocks – and, thus, the degree of diversification potential –
between two countries.
2 We use the two measures to develop adjusted – 
weighted – versions of our simple overall foreign investment bias variable. 
 
Our regression analysis covers a group of 21 OECD countries during the 
financial globalization period 1980-2007. Taking the work by Sørensen et al. 
(2007) as a benchmark and starting point, we use a panel regression 
framework to regress idiosyncratic consumption growth on idiosyncratic 
output growth where we specify the regression coefficient to be a function of 
a country's overall portfolio equity wealth, a country’s equity home bias and 
a country’s foreign investment bias. The results convincingly show that 
foreign investment bias plays a significant role in consumption risk sharing, 
complementing the effects of equity home bias and portfolio wealth. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
literature review, while section 3 elaborates on the data and the development 
of home bias and foreign investment bias variables. In Section 4, we carry 
out the empirical analysis and present our results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
 
Our paper links two different strands of literature. On the one hand it draws 
on the traditional consumption risk sharing literature and its relation to 
financial openness and cross-border investment, on the other hand it uses 
insights from recent literature on the geography of international investment.  
 
                                                 
1 See also Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) and Portes and Rey (2005). 
2 Alternatively, BW09 use the bilateral correlation between the stock market returns and the difference in 
industrial structure for each pair of countries as a measure of diversification potential. 5 
 
Empirical studies on international consumption risk sharing typically take two 
approaches to testing the hypothesis that consumption growth rates are 
highly correlated across countries. Early research focuses on the analysis of 
correlation patterns and compares cross-country output correlations with 
consumption correlations. Generally, one observes that output correlations 
are higher than consumption correlations, rejecting the null hypothesis of 
consumption risk sharing. This anomalous finding is known as the 
consumption correlation puzzle or quantity anomaly (notably Backus et al., 
1992, Obstfeld, 1994, 1995, and Lewis, 1999).
3  
 
More recently, studies of international consumption risk-sharing interpret the 
hypothesis of perfect risk-sharing differently and seek to assess if 
consumption growth rates respond uniformly to aggregate, but not to 
country-specific output growth (Mace, 1991, Cochrane, 1991, Lewis (1996), 
Asdrubali et al., 1996, Sørensen and Yosha, 1998, Melitz and Zumer, 1999, 
Becker and Hoffmann, 2006). This strand of empirical research regresses 
idiosyncratic consumption growth on idiosyncratic output growth, where 
under the null hypothesis the β-coefficient is statistically indiscernible from 
zero. In case β is above zero, it can be interpreted as the percentage 
deviation from the perfect risk-sharing case. Overall, the evidence rejects 
complete international risk sharing. However, for more recent periods that 
coincide with increased global financial integration more favorable results for 
risk sharing are found, particularly for developed countries.  
 
In recent years, the basic regression specification has been extended to 
investigate the various channels through which consumption risk is shared 
and to link the degree of risk sharing directly to the level of financial 
development and the depth of financial markets, the level of financial 
openness and integration and the degree of home bias. The preferred 
                                                 
3 To reconcile empirical findings with theory, the benchmark model of perfect risk-sharing has been 
amended in several respects: in several respects: (1) tradable versus non-tradable goods (Lewis, 1996, 
1999, Stockmann and Tesar, 1995, (2) market incompleteness (Kollmann, 1995, Shiller, 1993, Lewis, 
1996), (3) transaction costs (Obstfeld, 2001). For an excellent survey see Kose et al. (2007). 6 
 
approach in this literature is to make the β-coefficient in the basic 
consumption risk sharing equation an explicit function of exogenous variables 
measuring financial integration.  
 
Sørensen et al. (2007) document a marked increase in international income 
and consumption risk-sharing associated with high levels of foreign portfolio 
equity and foreign direct investment for the group of OECD countries. 
Fratzscher and Imbs (2009) extend the line of research to a bilateral context 
and confirm that intensity and composition (in terms of asset classes) of 
foreign assets are decisive determinants for the degree of risk-sharing 
between two countries. In particular, they find that financial assets with low 
transaction costs – bonds and equities – significantly provide international 
risk sharing. Note that Fratzscher and Imbs do pay attention to portfolio 
composition. However, they only distinguish different asset classes and pay 
no attention to geographical composition, whereas we focus on location 
choices for equities only. Kose et al. (2007) also use a number of measures 
for financial openness to show that industrial countries are the main 
beneficiaries of international risk sharing while the effect on developing 
countries so far is marginal. They point to threshold effects, structural and 
institutional problems and strong procyclicality in international capital flows 
to developing countries as underlying reasons for the lack of consumption 
risk sharing through financial integration. Bracke and Schmitz (2009) refine 
the analysis and show that the risk sharing properties of a foreign asset 
portfolio predominantly derive from countercyclical capital gains rather 
investment income. The potential for risk-sharing is found to be increasing 
since the mid-1990s for industrial countries, while absent in emerging 
market economies.  
 
Becker and Hoffmann (2006) distinguish between permanent and transitory 
shocks. Using a VAR analysis, they find that cross-country risk sharing of 
transitory shocks between countries is of comparable magnitude as between 
US states, while smoothing permanent shocks through holdings of state 7 
 
contingent financial assets appears to be much more successful between US 
states than between countries. In related work, Artis and Hoffmann (2008) 
point out that consumption risk-sharing is a function of the structure of 
business cycles and that regression results are blurred by concurrent 
changes in them across countries. They account for transitory and persistent 
shocks to output and find that OECD countries are better able to insure 
against the former than the latter. For an overview of short run versus long 
run risk sharing, we refer to Baxter (2011). 
 
The other strand of literature relevant to our paper is that on the – 
geographical – determinants of foreign portfolio investment and their impact 
on international consumption-risk sharing. Drawing on the gravity model 
literature for international trade in goods, Lane and Milesi- Ferretti (2008) 
test an array of bilateral, host and source country characteristics to explain 
the structure of external equity portfolios for the year 2001. They show that 
underlying trade in goods and cultural and physical proximity are the key 
correlates for bilateral foreign equity holdings, e.g. all else equal, doubling 
physical distance reduces equity holdings by 61%. This constitutes a puzzle 
since investors should shift their portfolios to remote countries, as those 
countries usually provide better diversification potential due to less 
synchronous business cycles. Instead, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) find 
that investors seem to forego this potential by holding equity in destinations 
with similar business cycles (as measured by the correlation coefficient of 
GDP growth rates). Portes and Rey (2005) also build on gravity models and 
find that they perform at least as well in explaining asset trade as goods 
trade. According to their study, the size of asset markets in host and source 
countries, next to informational symmetries, are the main determinants of 
gross transaction flows. They confirm the distance puzzle, but view distance 
as a proxy for informational asymmetries. Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) 
directly address the study by Portes and Rey (2005) and find, not 
surprisingly, that the distance puzzle is drastically reduced once trade in 
goods is controlled for. They employ a simultaneous gravity equations 8 
 
framework and point out the complementarity of trade in goods and assets, 
e.g. all else equal, a 10% increase in bilateral goods trade raises bilateral 
asset holdings by 6% to 7%. Bekaert and Wang (2009) confirm that proxies 
for capital market openness and familiarity and information variables are the 
dominant factors for explaining home bias. De Santis (2009) shows that 
portfolio re-allocation in the period 1997-2005 has generally gone in the 
theoretically predicted direction. That is, international investment flows move 




3. Data and Definitions 
 
Our dataset comprises 23 OECD countries with annual data between 1980 
and 2007. Data on GDP and private and public consumption are taken from 
the OECD Annual National Accounts database and are expressed in US-$ at 
constant prices with base year 2000. To obtain per capita estimates, 
population data from the same source are used. Data for our portfolio equity 
wealth measure and the home bias measures are taken from various 
sources, including the International Monetary Fund's Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey (CPIS) and International Financial Statistics (IFS), 
Datastream and the External Wealth of Nations Mark II (EWN II) dataset 




3.1 Consumption and Output 
We concentrate on idiosyncratic real consumption and output shocks and 
thus define variables relative to a worldwide aggregate, which is computed 
here as the sum of consumption and output respectively across all countries 
in our sample (at constant prices and converted to US dollars at PPP 
exchange rates). Table 1 provides some summary statistics for home relative 
                                                 
4 The CPIS data may be subject to measurement errors. However, no superior or even comparable data 
source exists to date. 9 
 
to world consumption and output growth for the period 1980-2007. The first 
three columns show mean growth rates of output, private (household) 
consumption and total (private plus public) consumption. The last three 
columns of table 1 show the correlation between domestic and world output 
growth and between domestic and world consumption growth, respectively. 
For most countries, the GDP correlation is substantially higher than the 
consumption correlation. Exceptions where the consumption correlation 
exceeds the output correlation are printed in bold. This is the case for 
Canada, Germany, Ireland (private consumption only), New Zealand, the UK, 
and the US (total consumption only). Only for New Zealand, Ireland and the 
UK is the difference substantial.  Overall, it demonstrates the well-known 
consumption correlation puzzle (see Backus et al., 1992, Obstfeld, 1994, 
1995, and Lewis, 1999) and the lack of consumption risk sharing over the 
sample period. 
 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
3.2 Equity Home Bias 
We define overall portfolio equity wealth (PEW) as a percentage of GDP the 












=               (1) 
 
where MCAPi,t is the equity market capitalization of country i, FAi,t and FLi,t 
are country i's foreign asset and foreign liability equity holdings equity, 
respectively. Data for MCAPi,t are retrieved from Datastream, and FAi,t and 
FLi,t are taken from the EWN II database and carefully updated with IFS data 
for recent years. The first two columns of Table 2 show the portfolio equity 
wealth measures for the years 1990 and 2005. Two characteristics stand out. 
The wealth measures, and therefore the potential for risk insurance, vary 
hugely across country, but are uniformly increasing over time. Countries like 10 
 
Mexico, Portugal and Greece with less mature and deep financial markets 
stand opposite to countries like Switzerland, the UK and Sweden with overall 
portfolio equity wealth positions exceeding GDP. 
 
The past two decades not only experienced a pronounced increase in overall 
portfolio equity wealth, but also a concomitant decline in equity home bias, 
as witnessed by Bracke and Schmitz (2009) and Sørensen et al. (2007). Like 






















    (2) 
 
where MCAPw,t is worldwide equity market capitalization. Important to note is 
that the EHB measure relies on our measure for overall portfolio equity 
wealth to ensure consistency in the empirical work. Under this definition, EHB 
takes on values between zero and one. A value of zero implies the absence of 
equity home bias; the share of domestic equity in the investment portfolio is 
consistent with the relative size of the domestic and world equity market. In 
contrast, a value of one implies that a country has exclusively invested at 
home. 
 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 show the absolute home bias measures for the 
years 1990 and 2005. It is apparent that financial globalization has changed 
the structure of portfolio equity wealth positions since its onset in the mid-
1980s. EHB is decreasing for all countries with the exception of Belgium and 
Mexico. Especially small open economies like Austria, Norway, and foremost, 
the Netherlands lead the ranks of the most financially integrated economies. 
Nonetheless, an average EHB of 0.56 in 2005 shows that investors' portfolio 
choices at the time were still tilted toward domestic equity and that market 
integration remained far from perfect. 
 11 
 
[Table 2 about here.] 
 
3.3 Foreign Investment Bias 
We now turn to the definition of foreign investment bias, where we need 
information on bilateral foreign asset holdings to assess the role of the 
geographical (national) composition of foreign equity portfolios. Until 
recently, no reliable data were available in this field, which is one of the main 
reasons that the geographical dimension of portfolio investment is under 
investigated so far (see De Santis, 2009).  However, the CPIS does provide 
such information from 2011 onward. It is the first and unique survey of its 
kind that records foreign portfolio equity and debt investment holdings for 
around 70 source and 240 host countries in a comprehensive and consistent 
way. For our sample of 23 OECD countries, we are considering foreign 
portfolio equity holdings in 33 host countries over the period 2001-2007, 
capturing the large majority of all foreign equity investment. The remainder 
is invested in other – RoW – countries for which no additional information is 
available.  
 
To determine a country’s foreign investment bias, we need to define both 
optimal and actual portfolio weights of foreign equity, where we need to 
correct for the country’ s home bias. Taking the international CAPM (Solnik, 
1974) as our starting point, market equilibrium is obtained when all investors 
hold the world portfolio. In the absence of home bias, it implies that the 
optimal, benchmark portfolio weight of country k’s equity in the global 
market portfolio should be MCAPk,t / MCAPw,t. Since we do not know the 
composition of portfolio investment across the RoW countries, we exclude 
them from our measurement of the optimal weight and define the optimal 













     (3) 
 12 
 
The actual weight of country i’s equity in country k’s foreign portfolio can be 
simply defined as the ratio of country i’s holdings of country k’s equity FEi,k,t 












=                            (4) 
 
Using equations (3) and (4) we can now define the foreign investment bias – 
that is underinvestment or overinvestment – of country i in country k, where 
the definition is such that a + implies underinvestment and a – implies 






i k i k i k Fib w w = −      (5)  
 
To arrive at a measure of the overall difference between a country’s actual 
foreign equity portfolio and the ideal world portfolio, we aggregate the 














=   ∑      (6)  
 
Where N is the number of host countries excluding the own country (32). 
SFib
abs is bounded between 0 and 1. A zero value of the average foreign 
                                                 
5 TFE is corrected for RoW portfolio holdings too to make the definition of actual weights consistent with 
that of the optimal portfolio weights. Note that total foreign portfolio equity, FAi,t, in (1) and (2) is 
measured independently from total foreign portfolio equity TFEi,t, in (4). The former comes from IFS and 
EWN II databases, while the latter uses data from the CPIS. As a result, small measurement errors arise. 
6 For ease of illustration, we drop the time subscript in the foreign investment bias formulas without loss of 
generality. 
7 BW09 also propose a normalized bilateral measure where overinvestment and underinvestment are 
normalized differently, resulting in asymmetric treatment of overinvestment and underinvestment. In our 
view, both this asymmetry and the problem of aggregating differently normalized bilateral overinvestment 
and underinvestment into one aggregate measure make the normalized measure less appropriate for our 
purpose. This notion was confirmed by some preliminary estimation results. 13 
 
investment bias measure SFib
abs  implies that a country’s foreign equity 
portfolio is an exact replication of the world equity portfolio, accounting for 
the country’s degree of equity home bias. Higher values imply larger 
deviations from the world portfolio.  
 
Since information on the geography of portfolio investment is only available 
for the years from 2001 onward, we focus on the cross-country dimension 
and work with time invariant measures of SFib in equation (6). They are 
obtained as averages over the period 2001-2007. Obviously, it imposes an 
additional constraint, but unreported evidence shows that cross-country 
variation in the SFib measure dominates time-variation. As a consequence, 
we feel a time-invariant treatment is warranted.
8 The first column of Table 3 
reports the average foreign investment bias value over the period 2001-2007 
for each country.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Comparing tables 2 and 3 shows that low home bias and low foreign 
investment bias do not necessarily coincide. Japan for instance has high – 
only Greece has higher – equity home bias as late as 2005, but a much 
better than average diversified foreign equity portfolio according to our 
foreign investment bias measure. It provides suggestive evidence that 
foreign investment bias deserves attention in its own right as an indicator of 
international risk sharing. 
 
3.4 Weighted Foreign Investment Bias 
The country-specific average foreign investment bias measure as defined in 
equation (6) provides an appropriate aggregate proxy for the degree to 
which a country’s foreign equity portfolio deviates from the optimal world 
portfolio. However, the measure weighs individual underinvestment and 
                                                 
8 The alternative of limiting the sample to 2001-2007 is unattractive as the time dimension in the panel gets 
too short. 14 
 
overinvestment in foreign countries equally and, thus, neglects the fact that 
not all foreign countries provide equal diversification benefits.  
 
To better appreciate this point, let’s take the example of the Netherlands.  
The Netherlands is close to Germany, both in terms of distance – they share 
a long border -, in terms of a similar industrial structure and in terms of 
economic integration. These two countries are major trading partners and 
share a common currency. As a result, their business cycles are strongly 
correlated. Comparing the Netherlands to for instance Australia gives a 
completely different picture. The countries lie on opposite sides of the globe, 
have different industrial structures and relatively limited trade. In general 
one could argue that the distance between Australia and the Netherlands is 
large in all relevant aspects. From a portfolio perspective, it would suggest 
that overinvestment in Germany and underinvestment in Australia will 
provide less diversification benefits to the Netherlands than overinvestment 
in Australia and underinvestment in Germany. Obviously, we would like our 
country-specific foreign investment bias variables to reflect this dimension of 
diversification. 
 
To this end, we develop two alternative foreign investment bias measures 
that explicitly take into account a country’s foreign equity portfolio 
composition and the pattern of its overinvestment and underinvestment. The 
first one weights individual overinvestment and underinvestment with a 
normalized distance variable. Because now the sign matters, no absolute 








100* ( )        
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i k dist











            (7) 
Where  , i k dist is the distance in miles between the capitals of countries i and k. 
The factor 100 is included for reasons of comparability with the other 15 
 
measures.
9 In general, high values of SFib
dist emerge for a given country i 
when the country overinvests in other countries nearby and underinvests in 
countries far away. Then, in nearby countries the bilateral negative Fib 
carries a low weight, whereas in faraway countries the bilateral positive Fib 
carries a high weight. Assuming that nearby countries generally are closer in 
economic structure and performance and, thus, have less diversification 
potential than faraway countries, high values of SFib
dist correspond with low 
diversification and low consumption sharing.
10  
 
The second weighting scheme depends on bilateral real GDP correlations over 















=∑               (8) 
 
The bilateral foreign investment bias is weighted with the normalized bilateral 
correlation coefficient of real GDP growth between the countries concerned. 
Note that the correlation weights in equation (8) do not sum to one as the 
weights are normalized by the country specific cross-sectional standard 
deviation of bilateral correlation coefficients (σi(ρi,k)). We prefer this 
normalization over the simple sum of bilateral correlation coefficients 
because of the presence of negative correlations which for some countries 




It can be easily shown from equation (8) that high values of SFib
corr 
correspond with high diversification and high consumption sharing. High 
                                                 
9 Alternatively, we used logarithmic distances for the normalization in equation (8). The regression results 
are only marginally affected and remain unreported here. They are available upon request from the authors.  
10 Note that equation (7) can also be interpreted as a covariance between distance and overinvestment and 
underinvestment. 
11 As a robustness check, we also computed a correlation weighted foreign investment bias measure using 
the format of equation (7) with the sum of bilateral correlation coefficients serving as normalization factor. 
Then, the weights again sum to one. Regression results with this alternative measure turn out to be 
qualitatively similar to those obtained with the measure from equation (8). 16 
 
values of SFib
corr emerge for a given country when the country overinvests in 
countries whose economy is weakly correlated with the domestic economy 
and underinvests in countries whose economy is strongly correlated with the 
domestic economy. Then, countries with bilateral positive Fib 
(underinvestment) on average carry a high weight due to the high bilateral 
GDP correlation, whereas countries with bilateral negative Fib 
(overinvestment) on average carry a low weight due to the low bilateral GDP 
correlation. 
 
Columns 2 and 3 of table 3 contain average values over the period 2001-
2007 for SFib
dist and SFib
corr. We note that the bilateral correlation coefficient 
between SFib
abs and SFib
dist is significantly positive (0.86), while the bilateral 
correlation coefficient between SFib
abs and SFib
corr is significantly negative (-
0.74). It implies that countries whose foreign equity portfolio composition is 
far away from the optimal world portfolio – high SFib
abs – typically overinvest 
in countries close by – high SFib
dist – as well as typically overinvest in 
countries that are similar in terms of GDP movements – low SFib
corr. It 
provides suggestive evidence that our overall foreign investment bias 
measure SFib
abs can be used as a proxy for portfolio composition effects. We 
now turn to the regression analysis to test whether foreign investment bias 




4. Consumption risk-sharing 
 
Our estimation strategy proceeds in several steps. All estimations are carried 
out for two time horizons, the entire time period 1980-2007 and the more 
recent sub period 1990-2007. It is often argued that cross-border portfolio 
investment accelerated only in the 1990s such that assuming a stable 
relationship back to 1980 is not warranted. Estimation results for both 
periods provide further insights.  Moreover, for our consumption measure we 17 
 
use either private consumption or the sum of private and public consumption 
as defined by the OECD Annual National Accounts database. Both 
consumption measures have been used in previous research. In addition, 
their joint use serves as a robustness check for our results and allows some 
inferences on the role of government in smoothing consumption. The panel 
data regressions have the following general form 
 
, , , log log ( log log ) i t t t i t t i t C C GDP GDP α β υ ∆ −∆ = + ∆ −∆ +    (9) 
 
where the disturbance term  , i t υ  is specified as the one-way error component 
model with a country-specific effect and a stochastic error term.
12 The β-
coefficient measures the co-movement between idiosyncratic GDP and 
idiosyncratic consumption and is allowed to be time-variant. In the perfect 
risk-sharing case the coefficient is equal to zero such that domestic 
consumption growth is independent from domestic output shocks.  
 
In our benchmark specification, we introduce interaction terms in equation 
(9). To this purpose, we model β as a function of portfolio wealth (PEW) and 
equity home bias (EHB). Both measures enter in deviation from an (un-
weighted) average across countries and time. Here, a bar above the variable 
indicates an average. 
 
______ ______
0 1 , 2 , ( ) ( ) t i t i t PEW PEW EHB EHB β β β β = + − + −     (10) 
 
A country with average overall portfolio equity wealth and equity home bias 
will experience consumption risk-sharing of degree (1-β0). Since PEW is a 
measure of a country’s financial development and market completeness, we 
expect above average values of PEW to lead to higher risk sharing. This 
implies a negative β1 coefficient. Higher than average equity home bias on 
                                                 
12 As in Sørensen et al. (2007), all estimations are performed as weighted least squares to correct for the 
presence of cross-country heteroskedasticity in our sample. 18 
 
the other hand indicates low levels of foreign diversification and low 
consumption risk sharing, implying a positive value for β2.  
 
The joint inclusion of a volume-based wealth measure and a portfolio 
composition variable is novel. Past research employed either volume-based 
measures of different classes of foreign asset and liability holdings (Sørensen 
et al., 2007, Kose et al., 2007, Fratzscher and Imbs, 2009, Bracke and 
Schmitz, 2009) or decomposition measures like our absolute EHB measure 
(French and Poterba, 1991, Sørensen et al., 2007). We argue that only the 
joint inclusion in a consumption risk-sharing framework is able to single out 
the ceteris paribus contributions of the two measures.  
 
Subsequently, we test our hypothesis that equity home bias is an insufficient 
measure of foreign portfolio composition as it only accounts for overall 
foreign equity, not for the degree of diversification within the foreign equity 
portfolio. For that reason we extend the specification of β to include a 
country-specific foreign investment bias variable SFib
j (in deviation of its 
cross-country average), where j is the index identifying each of our three 
aggregate foreign investment bias measures (j equals abs, dist, or corr): 
 
______ ______ ______
0 1 , 2 , 3 ( ) ( ) ( )
j j
t i t i t i PEW PEW EHB EHB SFib SFib β β β β β = + − + − + −     (11) 
 
We expect above average foreign investment bias to reduce consumption risk 
sharing, implying a positive value for coefficient β3 in case SFib
abs or SFib
dist 
are used, and a negative value when SFib
corr is used. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 presents results for private consumption for the periods 1990-2007 
and 1980-2007, while table 5 contains similar results for total consumption.
13 
First, we discuss the private consumption regressions for the period 1990-
                                                 
13 Due to incomplete data, Ireland and Iceland were deleted from the regression analysis, leaving 21 
countries in the sample. 19 
 
2007. In our view, the more recent period is the most important one to 
analyze as it fully takes into account the effects of global financial 
integration. 
 
The results for the basic specification – equation (9) – confirm our 
hypothesis. All coefficients are significant and have the correct sign. The GDP 
coefficient of 0.80 suggests that consumption risk-sharing is far from perfect 
on average as for countries with average portfolio wealth and equity home 
bias only 20 percent of idiosyncratic risk is diversified.  
 
The interaction coefficient on portfolio equity wealth is -0.25 in the basic 
regression for private consumption. It implies that countries with 10 percent 
points more equity wealth – in terms of their GDP – obtain 2.5 percent more 
consumption risk sharing. Lower equity home bias contributes to private 
consumption smoothing as well. The marginally significant and positive 
coefficient of 0.34 shows that a 10 percentage point below average equity 
home bias increases risk sharing with 3.4 percent.  
 
We now turn to the role of foreign investment bias. The results in table 4 
show that the coefficients on both SFib
abs and SFib
dist are significant and 
positive. It confirms our hypothesis that the composition of the foreign equity 
portfolio has an independent effect on consumption risk sharing, separate 
from the equity home bias effect. We fail to find a significant effect of the 
correlation weighted foreign investment bias measure SFib
corr.
14 An in-depth 
analysis of this puzzle is beyond the scope of this article and is left for future 
research. The results for 1980-2007 are qualitatively similar to those for 
1990-2007. The most important difference is the lack of significance of the 
equity home bias variable for the longer period.  
 
                                                 
14 This finding is consistent with BW09 who report that neither the bilateral stock market return correlation 
nor the industrial structure gap measure becomes significant with the correct sign in their analysis.  20 
 
We now turn to the results for total consumption in table 5. The results are 
roughly in line with those for private consumption. Portfolio wealth, equity 
home bias and foreign investment bias generally have the correct sign. 
Equity home bias is significant only for one specification now. The correlation 
weighted measure SFib
corr becomes marginally significant in the period 1990-
2007. The GDP coefficient value is about stable across sub periods but lower 
for total consumption than for private consumption, possibly due to the fact 
that governments use fiscal policies to contribute to consumption smoothing.  
 
Overall, we conclude that the results provide supportive evidence of the 
claim that foreign investment bias, when measured appropriately, plays a 
significant role in international consumption risk sharing. Put differently, our 
evidence shows that it is not only important to build a large foreign equity 
portfolio and reduce equity home bias. It is also the composition of this 
foreign equity portfolio that influences the degree to which foreign equity 
indeed is able to hedge idiosyncratic consumption risk. 
 
To further illustrate the contribution of the various explanatory variables to 
consumption smoothing, we take the regression equation for private 
consumption over the period 1990-2007 with the highest explanatory power, 
which includes the distance-weighted foreign investment bias measure. We 
compute the overall amount of consumption risk smoothing per country as 
well as the individual contributions of each interaction term, evaluated for the 
average values over the period 2001-2007. Table 6 presents the results. The 
GDP column is the estimated value of (1-β0) from equation (11) and implies 
that 22% of idiosyncratic output risk was diversified away across countries 
over the period 2001-2007. The next three columns give the percentage 
contribution of each of the interaction terms, based on the estimated 
coefficients β1, β2, and β3. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
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A number of points stand out. First, the degree of consumption risk sharing 
varies between 69.6% (Switzerland) to 5.5% (Mexico). Second, in terms of 
overall consumption risk sharing, the eurozone countries – apart from the 
Netherlands – show below average performance and as a group rank from 13 
to 20. It appears due to above average foreign investment bias and suggests 
eurozone countries invest too much in other – nearby and similar – eurozone 
countries. This increases their vulnerability to shocks within the eurozone. 
The Anglosaxon countries as well as the Scandinavian countries clearly 
outperform the continental European countries, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands excluded. Third, the table shows that there is quite some cross 
country heterogeneity in the sources of consumption risk sharing. For 
instance, Japan benefits from below average foreign investment bias as its 
foreign equity portfolio is much better diversified than that of most other 
countries (+14.0%) but simultaneously has above average equity home bias 
(-7.6%). Finland shows the opposite picture with below average equity home 
bias (+8.4%) and above average foreign investment bias. Fourth, foreign 
investment bias alone can contribute as much as 15.2% to consumption risk 
sharing (Australia) as well as reduce consumption risk sharing by a similar 
percentage (Belgium, -15.4%). It strongly suggests that foreign investment 





In this paper, we contribute to the international consumption risk sharing 
literature by accounting for the role of foreign equity portfolio composition in 
international consumption risk sharing. First, we argue that it is not the size 
of foreign portfolio investment as a fraction of domestic wealth alone that 
provides risk sharing. In addition, the composition of the foreign asset 
portfolio should matter as well. The closer a country’s foreign equity portfolio 
– conditional on the market value of that portfolio – approximates the world 
portfolio, the better its consumption risk sharing should be. The main goal of 22 
 
this paper is to develop three so-called foreign investment bias measures and 
empirically estimate their impact on consumption risk sharing.  
 
The first foreign investment bias measure for each country aggregates the 
absolute difference between optimal and actual foreign equity portfolio 
weights. This measure just looks at deviations from the world portfolio, 
without accounting for the specific investment pattern a country chooses. 
Subsequently, we develop foreign investment bias measures that do take 
into account portfolio composition, using either distance weights or GDP 
correlation weights. 
 
Our empirical analysis covers a group of 23 OECD countries during the 
financial globalization period 1980-2007. We use a panel regression 
framework to regress idiosyncratic consumption growth on idiosyncratic 
output growth where we specify the regression coefficient to be a function of 
a country's overall portfolio equity wealth, a country’s equity home bias and 
a country’s foreign investment bias. The results convincingly show that both 
the unweighted and the distance weighted foreign investment bias measure 
play a significant role in consumption risk sharing, complementing the effects 
of equity home bias and portfolio wealth. The correlation weighted measure 
fails to yield positive results. An in–depth analysis of this puzzle is left for 
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Table 1 Consumption and Output Growth (1980-2007) 
Country  Mean growth (%)  Correlation with World 
  GDP  C
h  C
t  GDP  C
h  C
t 
Australia  1.89  1.92  1.94  0.46  0.16  0.19 
Austria  1.86  1.70  1.65  0.33  0.19  0.19 
Belgium  1.78  1.43  1.34  0.53  0.39  0.29 
Canada  1.72  1.56  1.39  0.70  0.75  0.72 
Denmark  1.88  1.48  1.44  0.31  0.24  0.15 
Finland  2.30  2.25  2.02  0.61  0.51  0.51 
France  1.53  1.55  1.56  0.54  0.48  0.47 
Germany  0.79  0.56  0.46  0.70  0.74  0.71 
Greece  1.57  1.95  1.81  0.32  0.25  0.28 
Iceland  2.06  2.53  2.54  0.20  0.09  0.12 
Ireland  4.22  2.71  2.68  0.38  0.52  0.32 
Italy  1.55  1.72  1.63  0.53  0.19  0.26 
Japan  1.99  1.82  1.99  0.41  0.24  0.19 
Mexico  1.00  1.27  1.16  0.13  0.00  -0.06 
Netherlands  1.79  1.11  1.36  0.67  0.46  0.42 
New Zealand  1.35  1.66  1.56  0.23  0.49  0.47 
Norway  2.42  2.28  2.28  0.23  0.16  0.04 
Portugal  2.20  2.29  2.50  0.24  0.15  0.12 
Spain  2.28  2.07  2.38  0.52  0.47  0.40 
Sweden  1.85  1.20  1.08  0.64  0.55  0.52 
Switzerland  0.86  0.74  0.78  0.83  0.40  0.44 
United Kingdom  2.02  2.47  2.15  0.61  0.80  0.79 
United States  1.91  2.15  1.92  0.86  0.86  0.87 
             
World  1.75  1.85  1.73  1.00  1.00  1.00 
             
Notes: GDP refers to output, C
h to private (household) consumption and C
t to total 
(private plus public) consumption. 
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Table 2 Portfolio Wealth and Equity Home Bias 
Country  PEW  EHB 
  1990  2005  1990  2005 
Australia  0.18  0.96  0.82  0.78 
Austria  0.09  0.39  0.80  0.35 
Belgium  0.31  1.35  0.51  0.51 
Canada  0.26  1.06  0.68  0.60 
Denmark  0.20  1.14  0.80  0.52 
Finland  0.10  0.77  0.98  0.44 
France  0.15  0.77  0.79  0.57 
Germany  0.16  0.64  0.83  0.41 
Greece  0.05  0.29  0.95  0.89 
Iceland  -  -  -  - 
Ireland  -  -  -  - 
Italy  0.11  0.62  0.83  0.54 
Japan  0.93  0.79  0.96  0.83 
Mexico  0.01  0.07  0.65  0.82 
Netherlands  0.27  1.13  0.64  0.14 
New Zealand  0.07  0.51  0.86  0.56 
Norway  0.09  1.16  0.76  0.40 
Portugal  0.04  0.21  0.86  0.52 
Spain  0.10  0.54  0.95  0.73 
Sweden  0.17  1.39  0.70  0.47 
Switzerland  0.20  2.61  -  0.47 
United Kingdom  0.52  1.57  0.66  0.57 
United States  0.29  1.28  0.86  0.59 
         
AVG  0.20  0.92  0.80  0.56 




Table 3 Foreign Investment Bias  
(avg. 2001-2007) 





Australia  0.21  -0.07  -0.27 
Austria  0.40  1.57  -0.77 
Belgium  0.51  2.01  -0.88 
Canada  0.14  0.37  -0.30 
Denmark  0.26  0.90  -0.18 
Finland  0.46  1.63  -0.44 
France  0.45  1.63  -0.52 
Germany  0.42  1.60  -0.41 
Greece  0.31  0.75  -0.25 
Iceland  0.38  0.83  -0.30 
Ireland  0.24  0.74  -0.10 
Italy  0.40  1.36  -0.09 
Japan  0.10  0.01  0.09 
Mexico  0.56  1.11  -0.54 
Netherlands  0.16  0.53  -0.16 
New Zealand  0.28  0.64  -0.56 
Norway  0.23  0.75  0.13 
Portugal  0.56  1.64  -0.67 
Spain  0.53  1.57  -0.72 
Sweden  0.22  0.80  -0.22 
Switzerland  0.28  1.10  -0.12 
United Kingdom  0.25  0.43  0.17 
United States  0.17  0.24  -0.23 
       
AVG  0.33  0.96  -0.32 
STD  0.14  0.22  0.02 
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Table 4 Regression results private consumption risk sharing  
    Interaction Terms     
  GDP  PEW  EHB  FIB  Obs  Adj.R
2 
1990-2007 






  372  0.735 
SFib








372  0.741 
SFib








372  0.744 
SFib








372  0.735 
             
1980-2007 






  521  0.681 
SFib








521  0.687 
SFib








521  0.689 
SFib








521  0.678 
             
Notes: The dependent variable is idiosyncratic private consumption growth. The independent 
variables are idiosyncratic GDP growth (GDP) augmented with interaction terms for portfolio 
wealth (PEW), equity home bias (EHB) and different measures of foreign investment bias 
(FIB). The regression intercept is suppressed. We use weighted least squares. Standard errors 
are in parentheses, where ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table 5  Regression results total consumption risk sharing  
    Interaction Terms     
  GDP  PEW  EHB  FIB  Obs  Adj.R
2 
1990-2007 






  372  0.680 
SFib








372  0.698 
SFib








372  0.704 
SFib








372  0.683 
             
1980-2007 






  521  0.637 
SFib








521  0.648 
SFib








521  0.653 
SFib








521  0.637 
             
Notes: The dependent variable is idiosyncratic total consumption growth. The independent 
variables are idiosyncratic GDP growth (GDP) augmented with interaction terms for portfolio 
wealth (PEW), equity home bias (EHB) and different measures of foreign investment bias 
(FIB). The regression intercept is suppressed. We use weighted least squares. Standard errors 
are in parentheses, where ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
             
 




Table 6 Consumption Risk Sharing (%) 
Country  Contribution of     
  GDP  PEW  EHB  FIB  Total  Rank 
Australia  22.0  7.4  -3.5  15.2  41.0  8 
Austria  22.0  -1.4  18.3  -8.9  30.0  13 
Belgium  22.0  10.2  10.2  -15.4  27.1  14 
Canada  22.0  9.5  4.5  8.6  44.6  7 
Denmark  22.0  9.3  8.3  0.9  40.5  9 
Finland  22.0  5.5  8.4  -9.8  26.1  16 
France  22.0  6.0  0.2  -9.8  18.4  17 
Germany  22.0  2.5  11.2  -9.4  26.3  15 
Greece  22.0  -2.5  -9.4  3.2  13.2  18 
Iceland             
Ireland             
Italy  22.0  2.2  6.5  -5.8  25.0  16 
Japan  22.0  6.8  -7.6  14.0  35.2  10 
Mexico  22.0  -6.0  -8.4  -2.2  5.5  21 
Netherlands  22.0  11.6  19.9  6.3  59.9  2 
New Zealand  22.0  -0.9  7.0  4.7  32.8  12 
Norway  22.0  8.2  12.3  3.2  45.7  6 
Portugal  22.0  -3.2  4.2  -10.0  13.0  19 
Spain  22.0  -0.7  -1.0  -8.9  11.4  20 
Sweden  22.0  14.5  9.3  2.4  48.3  5 
Switzerland  22.0  38.3  11.3  -2.0  69.6  1 
United Kingdom  22.0  17.1  4.3  7.8  51.2  3 
United States  22.0  13.4  2.5  10.6  48.5  4 
             
 